PUBLICATIONS
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ABSTRACT | LINK
In recent years, there has been a revival of interest in genealogy among social and political philosophers. I argue, however, that this growing literature has tended to obscure what distinguishes genealogy as an approach to the interpretation of history. Any normative evaluation of something that appeals to an account of its origins has come to be called a “genealogy,” even if this account is explicitly hypothetical or unabashedly teleological. But a genealogy, according to Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault, is not merely an account of origins: it is an account of the contingent origins of the integration of an institution, practice, or concept within a regime of power and control. In other words, genealogy investigates an institution, practice, or concept through the lens of what Nietzsche calls “the will to power.” This paper aims to reconstruct the conception of the will to power Foucault inherits from Nietzsche in a way that explains why investigations into struggles for power from the past can provide insight into the strategies used for exercising and maintaining power in the present. The critical contribution of genealogy, I argue, is not normative insight but tactical knowledge: to oppose something successfully, first you must know your enemy.
WORKS IN PROGRESS
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ABSTRACT
This paper reconstructs the conception of theory and practice elaborated in the work of the French Nietzscheans, specifically Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, and Félix Guattari. I argue the French Nietzscheans seek a model of what theory can contribute to emancipatory politics that acknowledges the extent to which political processes depend on unruly, chance events. I call this the seizure model of critical theory, since it aims to provide resources for the recognition in theory of chance opportunities that can be seized in practice. These resources include the conceptualization of three kinds of event that open up possibilities for contesting and transforming regimes of power: the emergence of apparatuses, the outbreak of resistance to them, and the fusion of acts of resistance in a common struggle. Although these events cannot be predicted or orchestrated, recognizing them makes possible strategic and experimental political interventions capable of advancing the cause of human emancipation.
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ABSTRACT | LINK
In recent years, philosophical interest in functional analysis has grown in the wake of renewed engagement with the late work of Bernard Williams (2002). Following Williams, philosophers like Miranda Fricker (2016; 2019; 2026) and Matthieu Queloz (2020; 2021; 2022) have sought to uncover the functions of practices like forgiveness, concepts like “probability,” or values like truth by identifying the fundamental human needs that these practices, concepts, and values can be argued to satisfy. However, this method, which is sometimes called “pragmatic genealogy,” has come under criticism. In recent papers, Nicholas Smyth (2023) and Colin Koopman (2025) have argued that this approach is incapable of taking into account the contingent history of the practices brought under analysis. The critiques put forward by Smyth and Koopman raise an important question: is it possible to pursue functional analysis in a way that does not obscure the contingency of our practices? In this paper, I turn to another genealogical tradition in search of a mode of functional analysis capable of meeting this challenge: the work of the French followers of Nietzsche, specifically Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, and Félix Guattari. I argue that the French Nietzscheans develop an approach to functional analysis that shows how and why an element of collective life can take on a function through sheer historical accident. This account of contingent, or “emergent,“ functions is important not only because it proves that the tendency to identify functional analysis with idealized fictional models and universal human needs is misguided. It is also of vital importance for the study of power.
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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes Michel Foucault’s conception of resistance, revolt, and uprising through the lens of Georges Bataille’s conception of “excess.” Critics of Foucault have often leveled the charge that his investigations of power fail to show in what ways regimes of power can be opposed or resisted. At best, these critics argue, resistance is a topic that is underexplored and underthematized in Foucault’s writings. At worst, Foucault is said to conceive of power as having such a totalizing hold and pervasive presence in any social order that resistance becomes altogether inconceivable. These criticisms imply a stark rejection of Foucault’s own understanding of his work, since he often claims his analysis implies that resistance to power is as prevalent and even more fundamental than power itself. This paper seeks to reconstruct the conception of resistance that Foucault means to invoke in making this claim by showing his debt to the thought of Bataille. “Excess” is a functional notion in Bataille’s thinking, i.e. a behavior is an example of “excess” only if it resists integration into the normal functioning of a social order due to its violent or disruptive character. Eroticism, for instance, is fundamentally linked to excess since, in Bataille’s view, it is a form of sexual urge aroused precisely by the allure of violating and disrupting everyday taboos. I argue that for Foucault “resistance,” which occasionally expands into large-scale revolts and uprisings against a regime of power, initially consists in “excessive” behaviors that the regime is unable to functionally integrate or accommodate.
DISSERTATION
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ABSTRACT | LINK
This dissertation addresses a challenge facing Michel Foucault’s conception of systemic power, a challenge I call “the problem of organization.” Foucault argues that power is exercised through systems (dispositifs) that are made up of various elements, such as institutions, procedures, techniques, and discourses, that co-operate in the execution of strategies of mastery and control. However, this view gives rise to a question: What accounts for the organization in purpose and function exhibited by systems of power, such as the criminal justice system or the public health apparatus, if the strategies they put into operation are not consciously arranged or centrally coordinated by any specific person or group? I argue that Foucault answers this challenge by conceiving such systems as technological, drawing on accounts of technology found in the work of Georges Canguilhem, Martin Heidegger, and Friedrich Nietzsche. Foucault holds that this organization emerges not in accordance with a conscious plan, as in a conspiracy, nor through an evolutionary process, as in an organism, but instead, like in a technology, through the decentralized coordination made possible by the production and circulation of knowledge.